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The frequency of foreign exchange intervention among developed nations has waned in the 
last 10 years.  The Japanese authorities, for example, have not intervened since March 2004.  
Even as the frequency of developed country intervention has declined, intervention sizes have 
increased and intervention remains a policy tool for both developed and developing countries. 
The study of the causes and effects of intervention remains pertinent, therefore, both for its 
own sake and as a way to shed light on microstructure issues such as the role of information 
transmission.  The paucity of accurately timed intraday data on intervention and the simultaneity 
of intervention and exchange rate returns complicates the econometric study of intervention, 
however (Neely, 2005a; Neely, 2005b; Fischer, 2006).   
The views of individuals familiar with the practice of intervention provide a natural 
complement to econometric inference or event studies.  Central bankers who conduct 
intervention have collectively witnessed thousands of natural intervention experiments and 
presumably have important insights into its workings.  This observation has motivated at least 
three surveys of central bankers on the subject of intervention:  Neely (2000), Mihaljek (2004) 
and Lecourt and Raymond (2006).     
These three surveys differed in their coverage and emphasis.  Neely (2000) surveys the 
foreign exchange desk/reserve management departments of 22 central banks, asking about the 
mechanics of intervention.  Most responding authorities conduct intervention in spot markets, 
with domestic commercial banks, during domestic business hours.  Misalignments and volatility 
motivate interventions, while desire for market impact produces mixed effects on secrecy.  
Interestingly, Neely (2000) finds that central banks unanimously support the idea that 
intervention is effective in changing exchange rates. Lecourt and Raymond (2006) follow up by 
  1surveying only central banks of industrialized countries, exploring beliefs about the effectiveness 
of intervention through various channels.  After emphasizing the importance of expectations and 
credibility to the effectiveness of intervention, the authors go on to describe the quantity and 
frequency of G3 intervention from publicly released data.  Mihaljek (2004) exclusively focuses 
on authorities of developing countries, finding that interventions are small relative to market size 
and that most authorities view intervention as effective in calming disorderly markets.  Mihaljek 
(2004) finds that respondents consider intervention to work through expectations of both future 
monetary policy and intervention.  The study concludes that intervention’s effectiveness depends 
on the consistency of macro/monetary fundamentals with intervention.  Finally, a substantial part 
of the work deals with the beneficial effects of reserve accumulation on sovereign credit ratings 
and vulnerabilities to external shocks.  
Instead of focusing on intervention mechanics, the present survey asks market participants 
about their beliefs about the motivations for, effects of, and arguments against intervention.  
Neither does survey participation require recent intervention, the cover letter specifically asked 
authorities to refer to past experiences if they have conducted little or no recent intervention.  
Several authorities declined to answer the survey, however, citing a lack of recent intervention 
experience and/or institutional memory.  
In addition to studying authorities’ beliefs on a wide variety of intervention topics, the 
present survey considers whether a country’s exchange rate regime and per capita output explain 
the responses.  As discussed earlier, the exchange rate regime can obviously influence the 
motivations for and outcome of intervention.  Per capita output serves as a rough proxy for the 
sophistication of financial markets.  Central banks that face deep and sophisticated financial 
markets might well have different views on the reasons for and efficacy of intervention than 
  2those facing developing markets.  To presage the results, central bankers’ experiences with 
exchange rate regimes and—to a much lesser extent—the level of development of their financial 
markets are often correlated in sensible ways with their beliefs about intervention.  
A number of papers have surveyed foreign exchange traders, including at least three that 
touch on beliefs about intervention.  Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and 
Cheung et al. (2004) survey traders in Asia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, 
respectively.  None of these surveys encounter more than modest support for intervention among 
traders.  Most traders believe that intervention raises volatility and are split about whether 
intervention achieves its goals or moves exchange rates toward fundamentals.  The most positive 
response was in Cheung and Wong (2000).  From 55 percent (in Tokyo) to 71 percent (in Hong 
Kong) of traders say intervention moves exchange rates toward fundamental values but only 32 
to 61 percent believe that intervention achieves its goals. 
It is worth noting that papers that ask central bankers about their intervention practices and 
beliefs—like the present paper—face different challenges and contribute a very different 
perspective than papers that query foreign exchange traders.  The latter papers spend a good deal 
of time inquiring about job titles, seniority and position limits of their respondents in the belief 
that these characteristics explain beliefs about the foreign exchange market.  In contrast, the 
present study surveys people with similar job titles and a fair amount of seniority, which makes it 
unlikely that these factors determine differences in their views on intervention.   
The current survey contributes to the intervention literature by broadly surveying the beliefs 
of central bankers who have been directly involved in foreign exchange intervention and/or 
reserve management.  It expands upon some previously considered issues, such as secrecy and 
factors in successful interventions.  For example, this survey asks about factors that lead to the 
  3detection of secret interventions.  But it also extends the methodology to new topics, including 
effects on volatility, intervention response time, non-foreign exchange motivations for 
intervention, the potential for profitable intervention and arguments against intervention.   
Issues such as response time or non-foreign exchange motivations for intervention would be 
almost impossible to investigate with other methods but are of considerable importance for 
econometric investigations. For example, high frequency studies to investigate the effects of 
intervention are immune to endogeneity bias only if the frequency of the econometrician’s data is 
greater than the response time of the intervening authority.  Similarly, non-foreign exchange 
factors that influence intervention are potential instruments in a study of intervention.   
It is also useful to emphasize the limitations of any such survey.  While it might be desirable 
to ask a wide range of questions on intervention practices and interaction with monetary and 
other policies, a long survey would doubtless reduce the response rate and sample size.  To 
maximize the response rate and sample size, the survey was kept concise (2 pages) and omitted 
many questions designed to catalogue specific intervention practices that Neely (2000), Mihaljek 
(2004), or Lecourt and Raymond (2006) covered.  Keeping the survey short helped produce a 
very high response rate of 45 percent, compared to overall response rates in the range of 5 to 20 
percent for Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung et al. (2004).   
Another potential limitation is that central bankers might have incentives to answer some 
questions dishonestly.  For example, central bankers might be reluctant to report that intervention 
raises volatility.  Systematic dishonesty seems unlikely for several reasons.  First, the responses 
are anonymous, meaning that no central banker must justify or explain a potentially 
embarrassing response.  Second, practically speaking, no central banker will be personally 
affected by the marginal effect of his/her own anonymous answers published in an academic 
  4study.  And third, many central bankers—even those who have been involved in intervention—
will publicly criticize past intervention practices or oppose the practice itself.
1 Therefore, it 
seems likely that the respondents truthfully disclose their views.  
2.  Survey Structure  
 
The author sent the intervention survey and an accompanying cover letter to the foreign 
exchange department and/or trading desks of 52 monetary authorities, the group that participated 
in the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2005).  The cover letter specified that the survey questions 
pertained to sterilized intervention and that all responses would be kept confidential, with only 
aggregate results published.  Of the 52 monetary authorities surveyed, 28 responded but only 23 
answered some or all of the questions.  Of the five authorities that did not answer any questions, 
several cited a lack of recent intervention activity.  One Bank cited privacy concerns in declining 
to participate.  Two of the 23 authorities that responded to some or all of the questions preferred 
to remain anonymous.  Table 1 shows the 23 responding countries, along with their per capita 
GDP and their exchange rate regime in 1996, 2001, and 2006 according to the International 
Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (1996, 
2001, 2006).
2  Not all responding authorities answered all questions.    
                                                 
1 This author has spoken to several current or recent intervention policymakers who will argue that the practice 
of intervention is generally unwise and/or should be reserved for extreme situations.  These conversations have 
convinced the author that central bankers are willing to criticize intervention.  
2 One might note that the list of respondents includes several members of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU).  Although these countries do not currently conduct intervention operations, they do have their own 
institutional memories and beliefs about past intervention.  As this paper is primarily concerned with beliefs about 
intervention rather than current practices, I treat the members of the EMU as separate respondents.    
  5[Insert Table 1 about here] 
While the survey did not specifically inquire about the individual respondent’s job or 
seniority, the mailed and/or emailed responses often contained return addresses and/or titles that 
indicated that most of the responses were returned by the person to whom it had been sent or, in 
a few cases, a more appropriate office or subordinate.  In summary, 13 responses came from the 
head or deputy head of a department that appears to combine monetary and foreign exchange 
operations, three responses came from heads of departments of foreign exchange/reserve 
management operations, and three replies came from economists in international/foreign 
exchange departments.  One of the latter group was filled out in cooperation with the foreign 
exchange operations department.  The vast majority of respondents appear to have a background 
in operations while a much smaller group has a background in economic research.  Several 
returned surveys did not include any information that identified the individual respondent.   
It should be noted that one cannot assume that completed questionnaires represent official 
positions of the authorities.  In fact, at least one response specifically stated that the views were 
personal, not those of the authority.  Instead, it might be more reasonable to interpret the survey 
evidence as personal beliefs/opinions of officials who are experienced in financial operations.  
The survey first addresses whether the authority’s intervention experience is in flexible or 
fixed exchange rates, or both.  This issue is potentially important because the motivations for and 
the effects of intervention potentially depend on the exchange rate regime.  To take a couple of 
simple examples:  Intervention in fixed exchange rates is often found—at least ex post—to be 
done contrary to fundamentals and anecdotal evidence indicates that it is therefore very 
unprofitable.  In contrast, intervention in flexible exchange rates has been found to be conducted 
in the direction of fundamentals.  That is, central banks tend to purchase (sell) currencies that are 
  6undervalued (overvalued) relative to monetary or price level fundamentals and therefore such 
intervention has been very profitable for major central banks (Andrew and Broadbent, 1994; 
Leahy, 1995; Sweeney, 1997; Neely, 1998; Fischer, 2003; Becker and Sinclair, 2004).   
In all, 17 banks reported that they had exclusively intervened in flexible exchange rates, 1 
reported only intervening to support fixed rates and 5 reported that their responses pertained to 
both fixed and flexible rate regimes.  The answers of the central bank that intervened exclusively 
in fixed rates will be aggregated with the 5 that reported intervention in both types of markets to 
assure the confidentiality of the former bank.  To facilitate the exposition of results, authorities 
that intervened exclusively in floating markets will be known as “floaters” while all others will 
be known as “fixers.”  This terminology sacrifices literal accuracy for brevity; 5 of the 6 “fixers” 
also intervened in floating markets.  It would be more accurate—but too wordy—to refer to the 
fixer authorities as “authorities with some experience in fixed rate markets.”   
This survey deliberately asked authorities to define the exchange rate regime that 
corresponded with their intervention experience, rather than using a definition from IMF or 
another source.  The reason for this is that authorities might wish to report on beliefs and 
intervention experiences that pertain to a past—not current—exchange rate regime.  Therefore, 
the information in Table 1 need not match the self-reported definitions.  In addition, some 
authorities have had fixed/pegged experience that Table 1 fails to report.  For example, Italy and 
Mexico have had fixed rate experience since 1991 and the two anonymous authorities might also 
have had such experience.  
One might be concerned that there are too few fixers to justify a comparison of the beliefs of 
fixers versus floaters.  Or, one might be concerned that some of the fixers might be better 
described as floaters with modest experience in fixing rates.  It is true that both of these facts will 
  7potentially reduce the power of tests to contrast the beliefs of fixers and floaters.  Whether one 
can find such differences despite these problems is ultimately an empirical question, however.  
This study finds some intriguing differences between the attitudes of the two groups, which 
accord with intuition and are sometimes statistically significant.  This fact shows that the 
investigation is a useful exercise, despite its potential weaknesses.   
The use of statistical analysis with small samples merits some explanation.  This paper 
computes standard errors and test statistics with the normal/linear approximations to the ordered 
probit relations.  A small bootstrapping exercise was used to determine the properties of the 
standard errors and test statistics under the very small sample sizes.  Using several of the 
empirical distributions of the response, means of the sample were drawn with replacement to 
construct the small sample distribution of the standard errors of the mean.  Distributions for the t 
statistics were constructed similarly.  The bootstrapping exercise showed that although the 
sample sizes are small, the asymptotic coverage intervals are fairly accurate, perhaps even 
slightly conservative and the t statistics were correctly sized.
3  It seems likely that the asymptotic 
properties of the statistics accurately describe the small sample behavior of the statistics because 
the underlying data are sampled on a discrete space and are not subject to kurtosis or other 
factors that would tend to make the asymptotic statistics misleading.  
While the asymptotic properties of the statistics accurately describe their small sample 
properties, it is worth noting that the power of the statistics might be relatively low, especially 
when testing for differences between groups.  This low power means that the risk of Type II 
error—improperly failing to reject the null of equal means—is fairly high.  Of course, failing to 
                                                 
3 Given that the small sample sizes mean relatively low power, it would be potentially valuable to reconsider the 
exercises in this paper with Bayesian procedures that would balance the loss associated with types I and II errors. 
  8reject the null does not mean accepting the null; failing to reject the null means that no 
conclusion is drawn.  Therefore, this paper will sometimes note and speculate on the reasons for 
differences between groups that are not statistically significant.  
Another potential concern with conducting statistical tests on mean responses is that one 
must impute numerical values (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) to qualitative responses (strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree, strongly agree).  While it is sometimes incorrect to impute quantitative values to 
qualitative variables, the symmetry and clear, monotonic progression of the qualitative relation 
alleviates such concerns here.  
The next sections of the paper report authorities’ beliefs about four classes of issues:  1) the 
effects of intervention; 2) the intervention reaction function; 3) beliefs about intervention’s 
profitability; and 4) arguments against intervention.     
3.  The Effects of Intervention 
•  Intervention has effects in markets other than the one in which it is conducted. 
The first set of questions asks about the effects of intervention.  While Neely (2000) 
established that central bankers unanimously believe that intervention influences exchange rates, 
researchers have recently begun to consider whether intervention has effects in markets other 
than the one in which it is conducted.  Beine et al. (2005), for example, find that intervention has 
effects on currency components in markets other than that in which it is conducted.  The first row 
of Table 2 shows that most central bankers agree with the statement that “Intervention has effects 
in markets (currencies) other than the one in which it is conducted.”  The mean response was 
3.32, with a standard error of 0.20 and 12 of the 22 central bankers agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement.  The column labeled “Stat 1” shows that the t statistics for the null that the 
mean response is neutral (equals three) is 1.62.  Floaters support the multiple-markets-effect 
  9while fixers do not: the mean responses for the two groups were 3.47 and 2.80, with t statistics of 
2.10 and -0.48 (row 1).  The column labeled “Stat 4” shows that this difference between the 
estimated means of the two small groups is not statistically significant, however, with a t statistic 
of 1.43. Given the very small sample sizes—17 and 6—this failure to find a statistically 
significant difference between groups is unsurprising.  Overall, the results support the findings of 
Beine et al. (2005), who study floating rate, USD, markets.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
•  Authorities do not agree that intervention raises volatility. 
The effect of intervention on volatility is one of the most often studied issues in the 
intervention literature, yet it remains unresolved.  Many papers find that intervention seems to 
cause (or be associated with) higher volatility (e.g., Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Beine and 
Laurent, 2003; Frenkel et al., 2003; Edison et al., 2006; Fratzscher, 2006).  Many others find 
mixed effects, either over time or subsamples: Kim et al. (2000), Dominguez (2006), Hillebrand 
and Schnabl (2003), Smith et al. (2004), Fatum (2005) and Fatum and King (2005).  Disyatat and 
Galati (2007) find no effect on volatility. Aguilar and Nydalh (2000) reject the view that 
intervention lowers foreign exchange volatility.   
While most studies find that intervention raises uncertainty, the literature is not unanimous 
on this point.  This predominant view is puzzling because intervention is often explicitly thought 
to be implemented to counter volatility.  The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) document: 
“Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies,” for example, states that “A member should 
intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter disorderly conditions, which may be 
characterized inter alia by disruptive short-term movements in the exchange value of its 
  10currency.”
4 
Failure to correctly resolve the difficult issues of simultaneity/identification of the cross-
effects of volatility and intervention might explain the finding that intervention raises volatility.  
Given the difficulties with empirical investigations, the views of those who actually practice 
foreign exchange intervention might help resolve this unsettled question.  
Both groups of monetary authorities largely disagreed that intervention causes higher 
exchange rate volatility (Table 2, row 2).  The mean responses among all central banks was 2.86 
and the response of banks that also intervened in fixed exchange rate markets was similar, only 
3.20.  Neither mean was significantly different from neutrality (3).  Nine of the 22 central banks 
either disagreed (7) or strongly disagreed (2) with the statement.   
•  Central banks disagree on the horizon over which intervention raises volatility. 
The survey then inquired as to how long it takes for intervention to have its maximal effect 
on volatility and how long it takes for volatility to return to normal. Central bankers who agreed 
that intervention increases volatility, estimated that the maximal effect occurs in a few minutes to 
a few hours, though 2 authorities allowed for the possibility that the peak might take days to 
show up.  (Full responses are omitted.)  There was also much dispersion in estimates of how long 
volatility takes to return to normal.  The median view was that volatility returned to normal in 2 
or 3 days and the maximal educated guess was 6 months.  
•  Intervention operates through multiple channels. 
Another important issue is the channel through which intervention operates. Because 
sterilized intervention doesn’t affect either prices or interest rates, it doesn’t influence the 
exchange rate directly through the usual monetary mechanisms. But official intervention might 
                                                 
4 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=5392-(77/63).   
  11affect the foreign exchange market indirectly through the portfolio balance channel, the 
signaling channel, and/or the coordination channel.  The portfolio balance theory recognizes that 
sterilized intervention changes the relative supplies of bonds denominated in different currencies. 
If bonds in different currencies are imperfect substitutes, investors must be compensated with a 
higher expected return to hold the relatively more numerous bonds.  The higher return must 
result from a change in either the price of the bonds or the exchange rate.  The signaling channel 
suggests that official intervention communicates (signals) information about future monetary 
policy or the long-run equilibrium value of the exchange rate.  Sarno and Taylor (2001), Taylor 
(2005), and Reitz and Taylor (2006) have emphasized the potential importance of the 
coordination channel, which suggests that intervention might be important in coordinating the 
expectations of rational speculators.  
Knowledge of the channels by which intervention operates is potentially important for 
understanding microstructure issues, such as the transmission of information and the formation 
of expectations.  This issue has recently received less attention than when it was the subject of 
studies like Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Lewis (1995), Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) and 
Fatum and Hutchison (1999), but it is still unresolved.  
In Lecourt and Raymond’s (2006) survey, 7 of 9 central banks reported believing in the 
efficacy of the signaling channel, as opposed to the portfolio balance channel and “direct 
effects.”
5  This survey adds the options of the coordination channel and the restoration of 
liquidity in a one-sided market, a traditional view.   
This survey asked about the effectiveness of each channel separately, allowing support for 
multiple channels.  In accord with the literature, the central bankers don’t take the portfolio 
balance channel very seriously.  Row 3.1 of Table 2 shows that this channel elicited a mean 
                                                 
5 Vitale (2003) provides a model of the signaling channel.  
  12agreement of only 2.77.  Floaters were more somewhat more likely to agree with the statement 
than fixers, but the difference was not statistically significant. The respective mean agreement 
rates were 2.94 and 2.20 and the t statistic for their equality was 1.28.  Rich countries were much 
more likely to disagree with the effectiveness of the portfolio balance effect, however.  The t 
statistic for the regression of the portfolio-balance response on per capita GDP was -4, even after 
controlling for exchange rate regime. (Full GDP regression results are omitted for brevity.)  This 
disagreement likely reflects the fact that rich countries have deep financial markets in which 
existing bond stocks are very large compared to the size of intervention.  In addition, the bonds 
of developed countries might be fairly close substitutes for each other.  
Table 2, rows 3.2 and 3.4, show that central bankers are most likely to agree that intervention 
is effective through restoring liquidity (mean 4.00) and signaling (3.64).  The bankers also gave 
substantial support to the coordination channel (row 3.3) with a mean agreement of 3.59, among 
all banks.  All of these mean agreement rates were statistically significantly greater than three.   
Row 3.3 of Table 2 shows that floaters appear to support the coordination channel somewhat 
more strongly than the fixers (mean response of 3.71 for floaters vs. 3.20 for fixers) but support 
signaling less (3.53 versus 4.00).  Although the differences are not statistically significant, they 
are consistent with one’s intuition on the relative importance of the channels under different 
exchange rate regimes.  Floating exchange rate markets are precisely where expectations are 
likely to become unmoored and intervention can provide coordinating signals (Frankel, 1996).
6  
                                                 
6 Several features of floating exchange rate markets create concerns about expectations.  Survey forecasts of 
exchange rates are inaccurate and often not internally consistent (Frankel and Froot, 1987; Sarno and Taylor, 2001);  
Engel (1996) blames expectations for the failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP); Trend-following trading rules 
make risk-adjusted excess returns (Neely, 1998);  And switching from fixed to floating rates changes the volatility 
of real exchange rates and the ability of UIP to explain exchange rate changes (Mussa, 1986; Flood and Rose, 1996). 
  13Banks with fixed exchange rate regimes, in contrast, might be more concerned with market 
impressions of fundamentals.  Thus, they apparently emphasize intervention’s role in signaling.  
•  Coordination, size, and market conditions increase the probability of successful intervention. 
Regardless of the channel by which intervention operates, one would like to know what 
factors play a role in its success or failure.  The survey asked about the sorts of factors that make 
for successful intervention and the characteristics of a successful intervening authority.  The 
factors listed are those that the intervention literature has deemed important:  coordination, the 
first intervention in a series, size of transaction, market uncertainty about fundamentals, market 
uncertainty about current events, and leaning-with-the-wind intervention.  Humpage (1999) and 
Fatum (2002), for example, find that coordinated intervention is more effective than unilateral.  
(Coordinated intervention is the practice of multiple authorities intervening in the same direction 
on the same day.  It is unrelated to the coordination channel.)  Chaboud and Humpage (2005) 
find that the large, infrequent interventions of the Bank of Japan are particularly effective.  
Fatum and Hutchison (2006) find that coordination and size are both important.  Fischer and 
Zurlinden (1999) find that only the initial Swiss intervention in a series matters.  The 
microstructure literature, e.g., Dominguez (2003) and Pasquariello (2002), motivated the market 
uncertainty options.  And Neely and Weller (2006) show that in a model with limited arbitrage, 
the central bank intervenes less (more) aggressively when the exchange rate deviates a moderate 
(extreme) amount from fundamental value.   
Rows 4.1 through 4.6 of Table 2 show that all of these factors received substantial support 
from the combined set of central banks.  In particular, the idea that coordination (3.90) and size 
(3.82) were important received the most agreement from the overall group.  But the other factors 
also received support:  uncertainty about fundamentals (3.73), first in a series (3.71), leaning-
  14with-the-wind (3.64), and uncertainty about current events (3.62).  All these mean responses 
were highly significantly different from neutral.  
The fixers were less sanguine than the floaters about all the factors noted, except 
coordination and leaning-with-the-wind.  Despite the small sample size, the difference of opinion 
between floaters and fixed rate authorities was significant (marginally) for the size of 
intervention.  That is, floaters put more emphasis on the size of interventions.  
Looking at characteristic of successful authorities—rather than successful interventions—the 
survey asked if some authorities were more successful than others in intervening.  Row 5 of 
Table 2 reports an overall mean agreement rate of 3.55, which had a t statistic of 3.68 against the 
null that it equaled 3 (neutral).  Floaters and fixers agreed with this idea at similar rates.  
•  Successful authorities act consistently with fundamentals, have substantial resources, a 
reputation for past success and choose trading opportunities skillfully. 
The survey then asked whether the following characteristics made for a successful 
intervening authority: substantial resources, consistency of strategy, skillful intraday choice of 
trading opportunities and reputation for past success.   Rows 5.1 through 5.4 of Table 2 show that 
both floaters and fixers broadly agreed that consistency of intervention with fundamentals is 
important (overall mean was 4.50), a reputation for past success is helpful (overall mean was 
4.18), substantial resources help an authority be successful (overall mean was 3.95) and that 
skillful choice of  trading opportunities within the day is important (overall mean was 3.86).   
  15The differences of opinion between the two groups of banks are mostly modest and 
insignificant on the factors that contribute to a successful intervention.  The largest difference 
pertains to the importance of a reputation for success, which fixed rate central banks appear to 
find more important (4.06 for floaters versus 4.60 for fixers). This difference had a t statistic of -
1.92 (see row 5.4).  This is consistent with the emphasis placed on the credibility of fixed 
exchange rates.  
•  Authorities in rich countries are less likely to credit substantial resources for success. 
Ironically, authorities of high-income countries are significantly less likely to agree that large 
interventions are helpful (Table 2, question 4.3) or that substantial resources improve an 
authority’s intervention success rate (Table 2, question 5.1).  When the responses to these 
statements are regressed on exchange rate regime and log of purchasing power parity adjusted 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP), the coefficients on GDP have t statistics of -2.18 and -
2.24, respectively, indicating that rich countries are much less likely to agree that substantial 
resources are helpful.  (These regression results are not in the tables.)  Perhaps authorities of rich 
countries find it harder to influence the more developed, deeper markets that they face.  Or, the 
authorities of high-income countries might be more cognizant of the limitations of great 
resources or less aware of the limitations imposed by lack of resources. Finally, it is also possible 
that central banks of developed economies have easier access to short-term financing and see less 
need to hold substantial reserves.  
4.  The Intervention Reaction Function 
Although many researchers have investigated the intervention reaction function, many 
questions remain.  Much research has found that central banks in floating markets intervene 
under a fairly consistent set of conditions (Edison, 1993; Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996).  
  16Intervention has, for example, often been deployed to counter “disordered markets” by leaning 
against short-term fluctuations.  Such intervention has usually been combined with other features 
like targeting the “long-term” value of the exchange rate implied by fundamentals. 
One question that traditional econometric (or event study) methodology cannot easily answer 
is whether intervention responds directly to factors outside the foreign exchange market.  A 
second question is how long it takes for intervention decisions to be made and translated into 
actual intervention.  That is, how long is the decision loop of the intervening authority?  Both of 
these issues are important in the structural study of intervention.   
External events that directly influence intervention are important because they help inform 
the search for instruments.  For example, when one searches for instruments to be used in 
estimating the effects of intervention in a structural, linear model, one needs an instrument that 
predicts intervention, but does not directly influence exchange rates.  Conversely, when one 
estimates an intervention reaction function, one typically searches for an instrument that predicts 
exchange rate changes but does not directly influence intervention.   
The response time for intervention is important because the recent spate of high-frequency 
intervention studies depend on reaction time for their justification.  That is, an important 
potential advantage of high-frequency studies is that they can avoid simultaneity between 
intervention and exchange rate returns at a frequency higher than the decision loop of the 
authority. If an authority takes 10 minutes to react to exchange rate developments but exchange 
rate returns are available at a 5 minute frequency, then there is no contemporaneous effect of 
exchange rates on intervention and a simple regression of returns on intervention can produce 
consistent estimates of the pseudo-structural impact of intervention.   
In addition, a survey is useful in separating the factors in the decision to intervene from the 
  17factors that govern conditional intervention size.  The final issue in this section pertains to 
secrecy.  This survey extends previous work on secrecy (i.e., Neely, 2000; Lecourt and 
Raymond, 2006) by asking about factors that increase the probability that a secret intervention 
will be detected, and by considering the structural reasons for secrecy that Beine and Bernal 
(2005) discuss and empirically investigate.
7   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
•  Intervention does not respond directly to factors outside the foreign exchange market. 
The survey asked for examples of cases in which “Intervention sometimes responds directly 
to conditions or factors outside the foreign exchange market.”  The first column of Table 3 lists 
the possible non-foreign exchange factors to which intervention directly reacts, which 15 
authorities suggested.  Five authorities suggested that some variation of “political events” or 
“international events” might trigger intervention.  One might interpret those to include wars, 
political assassinations, elections or other changes in governments.  Four central banks referred 
to the desire to reinforce or signal changes in monetary policy.  One authority voiced a 
willingness to intervene to coordinate with other central banks.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The first row of Table 4 shows that authorities do moderately agree with the idea that 
intervention sometimes responds to factors outside the foreign exchange market. The overall 
mean response is only 3.43, with a t statistic of 1.79.  Fixers unanimously agree with the 
statement, but floaters show less concurrence.  
One might interpret the examples in Table 3 as factors outside the foreign exchange market 
                                                 
7 Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) develop models to rationalize the use of secret intervention.  
  18that could elicit intervention only through their effect on the foreign exchange market.
8  That is, 
if an assassination had no appreciable effect on the exchange rate, intervention would be an 
unlikely reaction.  The most reasonable interpretation of the results in Table 3 is that while no 
non-foreign exchange factors would directly elicit intervention, some might indirectly elicit 
intervention through their effect on exchange rates.  
•  Central banks can respond quickly with intervention, especially if they are on alert. 
How long does it take for intervention decisions to be made and to translate into actual 
intervention?  Because reaction times might depend on whether a central bank expects to have to 
intervene, the survey asked about reaction times in 2 cases:  1) If there had been no recent 
intervention; and 2) if the monetary authority was already on “alert” for developments.   
The second column of Table 3 shows that, if there was no recent intervention, all central 
banks but one reported being able to intervene within 6 hours and all but four within 2 hours.  
The median response time was less than 60 minutes.  One central bank reported that it would 
take 1-5 days to initiate intervention if there had been none recently.  Five central banks reported 
response times of 5 minutes or less.   
If central banks were “on alert” to intervene, the response times declined precipitously (third 
column of Table 3).  The median response time was one minute.
9  The longest response period 
that any central bank reported was “less than an hour.”  All other responses were 10 minutes or 
                                                 
8 Several central banks cited “non-FX” factors that I would consider to pertain directly to the foreign exchange 
market.  For example, two central banks expressed the view that intervention responded to real appreciation.  
Another central bank referred to foreign exchange volatility as precipitating intervention.  Also, two central banks 
referred to intervention to accumulate reserves, which is not usually considered intervention per se. 
9 I interpret responses such as “immediately” and “instantly” as one minute or less in this discussion. Although 
one could dispute this quantitative interpretation, no reasonable interpretation would change the inference.  
  19less.  Authorities that are “on alert” can react very quickly to developments.   
What factors figure into the size of the intervention, conditional on the existence of 
intervention?  Such a question is difficult to answer with traditional econometric methodology 
and the literature has been largely silent on this specific issue.
10   
•  Market liquidity, trends and desire-to-make-an-impact influence the size of interventions. 
Rows 2.1 through 2.3 of Table 4 show that central bankers tend to agree that each of the 
following three factors influence the size of interventions: 1) market liquidity (mean response 
was 4.18); 2) strength of market trends (4.14); and 3) desire to make an impact (4.09).  All these 
means were significantly greater than three.  Floaters offered somewhat greater agreement with 
the first two statements than did fixers, but the difference was not significant.  Authorities’ views 
on the determinants of a successful intervention (Table 2, rows 5.1 to 5.4) are positively 
correlated with views on the determinants of the size of intervention (Table 4, rows 2.1 to 2.3).  
•  Central bankers do not reinforce successful intervention. 
Central bankers do not feel the need to reinforce success, however.  Row 3 of Table 4 shows 
that respondents tend to disagree with the proposition that “after an initial intervention, my 
authority is more likely to intervene again if the initial intervention was successful.”  The mean 
response to this statement was 2.68.  Responses of central banks that intervened exclusively in 
floating markets were similar to those with experience in fixed rate markets (2.65 versus 2.80).  
Finally, we turn to the issue of secrecy.  Interventions are usually considered to be secret if 
the monetary authority attempts to conceal its foreign exchange transactions, though such 
dealings may be made public at a later date.  Central banks have widely varying policies on 
secrecy.  The Swiss National Bank, for example, reveals all of its intervention activities on the 
                                                 
10 Kearns and Rigobon (2005) differentiate between the two decisions and discuss their endogeneity.   
  20same day that they occur (Fischer and Zurlinden, 1999).  The Bundesbank, in contrast, had a 
reputation for attempting to conceal its activities (Reitz and Taylor, 2006).   
  When asked, “How often does your authority conduct intervention secretly?” about ½ of 
responding authorities said “never.”  Several central banks reported percentages in excess of 80 
percent, however.
11  The tables omit these results for brevity. 
•  Central banks modestly agree that Beine and Bernal’s (2005) factors motivate secrecy. 
Beine and Bernal (2005) suggest several reasons why central banks might want to keep their 
intervention secret:  previous failure in intervention, inconsistency with an exchange rate target, 
inconsistency with monetary/macro fundamentals, and intervention contrary to recent trends.   
Perhaps because so many central banks don’t intervene secretly, there was only modest 
agreement that these factors motivated secret intervention.  Rows 4.1 through 4.4 of Table 4 
show that the mean agreement scores were 3.42 for previous failure in intervention, 3.47 for 
inconsistency with an exchange rate target, 3.42 for apparent inconsistency with monetary/macro 
fundamentals and only 3.26 for leaning-against-the-wind intervention.  The first three mean 
scores are significantly greater than neutral (three) at the five percent, one-sided level.   
Despite the modest levels of agreement, the overall results are consistent with the factors 
proposed by Beine and Bernal (2005).  Mean scores for the floaters and fixers were similar and 
there was a high degree of correlation in authorities’ answers on these questions.  That is, a 
central bank that was likely to agree with one reason for secrecy was likely to agree with others 
as well.  For example, there was a 93 percent correlation between answers to the two questions 
                                                 
11 Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) point out that there are two dimensions of secrecy, whether intervention 
occurs and how large it is.   This paper focuses on the first dimension, while Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) 
suggest that central banks are more concerned with the second.  
  21on inconsistency (4.2 and 4.3).  This is clearly statistically significant; the standard error for a 
correlation with 20 observations is about 0.22.  Full correlation results are omitted for brevity.    
•  Large and coordinated secret interventions are more likely to be detected. 
Central banks concur more about factors that increase the probability that a secret 
intervention will be detected by market participants.  Rows 5.1 through 5.5 of Table 4 show that 
the respondents agree that large and coordinated interventions are more likely to be detected by 
the market, with mean scores of 4.21 and 4.16, respectively.  The idea that large interventions are 
easier to detect is consistent with Klein’s (1993) results on public reports of intervention.  The 
mean response to the idea that recent previous interventions also increase the probability of 
detection is fairly high, 3.89 (row 5.3).  A greater perceived misalignment of exchange rates 
from fundamentals and past success are less likely to increase the probability of detection.  Those 
factors receive mean scores of 3.53 and 3.42, respectively (rows 5.5 and 5.4).  All of these mean 
rates of agreement were highly significantly greater than three (neutral) for the floaters and the 
overall results. 
Remarkably, fixer authorities unanimously strongly agreed that coordination with other 
central banks would increase the probability of detection of a secret intervention.  And the 
difference between floaters and fixers on the revealing nature of coordination was also very 
statistically significant, with a t statistic of -3.26 (row 5.2). 
5. Profitability of Intervention and Active Reserve Management 
Milton Friedman’s (1953) conjecture that stabilizing speculation is equivalent to profitable 
speculation has motivated much research on the profitability of intervention.  While the link 
between profitability and stabilizing speculation is tenuous—Salant (1974), Mayer and Taguchi 
(1983), and De Long et al. (1989) provide counterexamples—researchers continue to find that 
  22major central banks have made significant profits through intervention in floating rate markets 
(Andrew and Broadbent, 1994; Leahy, 1995; Sweeney, 1997; Neely, 1998; Fischer, 2003; 
Becker and Sinclair, 2004).   
The subject of the profitability of intervention is very discomforting to central bankers 
despite the fact that almost all relevant studies have shown that major central banks have clearly 
made excess returns on intervention in floating rate markets.  Central bankers are loath to lose 
taxpayer resources and almost equally unwilling to be seen as profiting from trades with the 
public.  For example, the 21 central banks that took part in the survey by Neely (2000) were 
unanimous that profitability was never a motive for intervention.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
•  Floating rate central banks believe that they can profit from intervention at all horizons but 
seem to be concerned about the risk. 
The answers to the current survey illustrate this ambivalence toward profitability.  The first 
question is “Suppose that the proper legal authority (government or bank governor) were to 
instruct your monetary authority to actively manage its reserve assets by buying/selling foreign 
exchange. (Both the size and currency composition of reserves are actively managed.)  Could 
active management generate a positive excess return—in excess of opportunity cost—at 
reasonable risk for the taxpayer?”  Row 1 of Table 5 shows that although more central bankers 
agreed with this statement than disagreed, the fact that 3 central bankers strongly disagreed 
lowered the mean agreement score to 2.95.  The views of fixers (mean score 2.33) largely drive 
this overall disagreement.  Central bankers who intervened exclusively in floating markets had a 
mean score of 3.21 and the difference between floaters and fixers (3.21 versus 2.33) has a t 
statistic of 1.82.  
  23The responses to the next assertion: “I believe that my authority’s trading desk could trade 
profitably with holding periods over the following horizons” underscore the ambivalence of 
central bankers’ thinking on profitability.  Rows 2.1 through 2.3 of Table 5 show that survey 
participants believe that their trading desks could trade profitably at intraday (3.29), 
weekly/monthly (3.38) and one-to-ten-year holding periods (3.38).  The t statistics associated 
with these answers are 1.59, 2.07 and 1.54.  In other words, while the overall responses tend to 
disagree that active return management could create a reasonable risk-return tradeoff, 
respondents think that their trading desks could trade profitably over all horizons.  
There was positive correlation between the answers to all the profitability questions, 
however.  Authorities that believed that their trading desks could trade profitably at one horizon 
were more likely to believe that they could trade profitably at other horizons.  The correlations 
between the answers to statements 2.1 through 2.3 were 0.31, 0.58,  and 0.31.
12  The tables omit 
full results for brevity.  And authorities that believed that they could trade profitably with a 
reasonable risk were more likely to believe that they could trade profitably at all horizons.  The 
correlations were 0.59, 0.47, and 0.57 between the responses to statement 1 and statement 2.1, 
2.2, and 2.3 in Table 5.   
•  Fixers are less optimistic about profiting from intervention. 
Central bankers who participated in fixed rate markets were less sanguine about the potential 
profitability than those that participated in only floating markets.  The mean scores for the three 
horizons were 2.83, 3.17 and 3.00 for the fixed rate central banks and 3.47, 3.47 and 3.53 for the 
authorities that intervened exclusively in floating markets (rows 2.1 through 2.3).  The responses 
of the floaters were significantly different from neutral while those of the fixers were not.  
                                                 
12 The correlations will all have asymptotic standard errors of approximately 0.21. 
  24While the differences between the agreement rates for the two groups are not statistically 
significant, they do accord with publicly known, diverging experiences of monetary authorities 
in floating and fixed markets.  For example, during the 1990s there were a number of successful 
speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes:  the ERM crises of 1992/93, the Mexican 
Peso crisis of 1994 and the Asian currency crises of 1997.
13  Market observers believe that 
central banks defending these fixed parities lost significant amounts of money.  In contrast, a 
substantial amount of evidence indicates that all major central banks have made positive, 
significant, excess returns with intervention in floating markets. 
To summarize the results on profitability, central bankers who act exclusively in floating rate 
markets tend to agree with the proposition that they can make risk-adjusted returns for the 
taxpayer with intervention (mean of 3.21, row 1).  In contrast, authorities with experience in 
fixed rate markets tend to disagree that they could make risk-adjusted returns (mean of 2.33, row 
1) and this difference has a t statistic of 1.82.  And floaters were more optimistic in responding to 
the question as to whether their trading desks could make excess returns at various horizons.  
Central bankers in floating rate regimes have the greatest confidence in their trading desks over 
the longest horizons, precisely the horizons at which studies have shown that floating rate 
intervention has been profitable. 
One way to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the answers is that the first question asked 
explicitly about “risk-adjusted” returns.  It might be the case that some central bankers would 
subjectively consider the risk too great to justify.  This seems to be particularly true to central 
bankers with experience in fixed rate markets.  
                                                 
13 The “fixed” exchange rate regimes are liberally defined to include target zones and crawling pegs.  
  256.  Arguments Against Intervention 
Finally, we ask the central bankers to evaluate arguments that are commonly used against 
foreign exchange intervention.  Four arguments were considered:  1) Intervention will confuse 
the public with respect to monetary/other policies; 2) Intervention is ineffective at changing 
exchange rates; 3) Intervention will move exchange rates away from market determined values; 
and 4) Intervention will substitute for other necessary policy changes.   
These arguments have been culled from a variety of sources.  Mohanty and Turner (2005) 
suggest that intervention might confuse the public with respect to monetary policy.  Schwartz 
(2000) and Humpage (1999) outline some arguments against intervention.  Schwartz (2000), for 
example, implicitly argues that intervention is unlikely to be effective because central banks will 
have, at best, a very modest informational advantage over private agents.  Truman (2003) points 
out that there is no empirical evidence of a long-run effect of intervention.
14  Finally, critics 
accused the Banco de Mexico of substituting intervention for necessary policy changes prior to 
the peso crisis of 1994.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
14 It is true that there is no evidence of a long-run effect of intervention, but there is a good reason for this:  
Uncertainty about the exchange rate’s value grows with the forecast horizon, which precludes any conclusion about 
intervention’s effect except at short horizons.  In other words, if a random walk reasonably well approximates the 
exchange rate process, the size of the forecast confidence interval for future exchange rates increases with the square 
root of the forecast horizon, ◊H.  As the forecast horizon increases, any finite effect of intervention will be 
swamped by the ever-increasing uncertainty about future exchange rates.  Intuitively, because we are very uncertain 
about the value of the exchange  rate one year ahead—with or without intervention—we cannot know if intervention 
has an effect at that horizon.  
  26•  Common arguments against intervention do not persuade the responding authorities. 
Respondents did not strongly support any of these arguments against intervention.  The 
argument that found the most agreement is that intervention will be used to substitute for other 
necessary policy changes, with an overall mean agreement score of 3.36 (see Table 6, row 1.4).  
The average agreement among floating-rate central banks is a statistically significant score of 
3.53, while it is only 2.80 for fixers (row 1.4).  In contrast to the modest support for this 
proposition, respondents show almost no support for the other three propositions:  1) Intervention 
will confuse the public with respect to monetary/other policies; 2) Intervention is ineffective at 
changing exchange rates; and 3) Intervention will move exchange rates away from market 
determined values.  The mean overall agreement scores for these three assertions are 2.64, 2.55 
and 3.00, respectively (rows 1.1 through 1.3).  The mean for the statement that “intervention is 
ineffective” is significantly less than three, with a t statistic of –1.98.  This disagreement with the 
statement that intervention is effective is consistent with findings in Neely (2000).  Floating and 
fixed-rate central banks had similar rates of disagreement with these statements.   
7.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper describes the results of a survey sent to 52 monetary authorities regarding their 
experiences with and beliefs about foreign exchange intervention.  23 of those authorities 
responded to some or all of the questions, including 17 with experiences exclusively in floating 
rate regimes and 6 that have experience in fixed exchange markets.  Most responses came from 
heads of departments devoted to monetary and/or foreign exchange operations.  The purpose of 
the survey was twofold:  1) to investigate questions that would be very difficult or impossible to 
investigate with more conventional empirical techniques; and 2) to challenge the results of the 
empirical literature on intervention with new evidence from participants.  
  27The paper provided evidence on several issues that have been little researched—perhaps 
because they would be very difficult or impossible to investigate with traditional methods.  For 
example, this paper established that reaction times for intervention are fairly rapid, but time-
varying, dependent on whether the authority is alert to market developments.  The paper also 
inquired about non-foreign-exchange factors in intervention decisions.  All the factors cited—
wars, assassinations, elections etc.—are unlikely to directly elicit intervention, but rather do so 
through their effects on the foreign exchange market.  Further, the paper studied the determinants 
of the size of intervention, which Kearns and Rigobon (2005) emphasize is a separate empirical 
issue from the propensity to intervene.  The paper finds that monetary authorities are unlikely to 
reinforce successful intervention.  And the paper extended the literature on secrecy by inquiring 
about the factors in the probability of detection of secret interventions.  
Reassuringly, the central bankers supported many of the conclusions of empirical research on 
intervention.  For example, respondents agreed that intervention’s effects are not confined to the 
market in which it is conducted and the signaling, coordination and liquidity channels are more 
plausible than the portfolio balance channel.  And they found Beine and Bernal’s (2005) 
motivations for secrecy to be plausible.   
On other issues, however, correspondents dissented from academic conventional wisdom.  
Respondents were likely to disagree with the assertion that intervention increases volatility, for 
example.  And central bankers who conduct intervention were unpersuaded by most of the 
common arguments against intervention.  The only argument that participants tended to support 
is that intervention might be used to substitute for other necessary policy changes.  
Despite the small sample size, exchange rate regime and national income sometimes 
significantly explain the attitudes and beliefs of authorities on intervention.  For example, per-
  28capita GDP significantly explains whether a responding authority believes that substantial 
resources are important for the success of intervention.  Floating rate authorities consider the size 
of intervention to be more likely to raise the probability of a successful intervention.  And fixers 
are more likely to believe that coordination increases the probability that the market will detect 
secret interventions.  
Monetary authorities are a bit schizophrenic about the profitability of intervention.  The mean 
response to the statement that “active reserve management could generate a positive excess 
return—in excess of opportunity cost—at a reasonable risk for the taxpayer,” was only 2.95 
(Table 5, Row 1), indicating very mild disagreement, on average.  But central bankers agreed 
that their trading desks could trade profitably at intraday horizons through multi-year holding 
periods.  Floating authorities were more optimistic than fixers about their ability to generate 
excess returns at reasonable risk and the difference is marginally statistically significant, despite 
the very small samples.  The discrepancy between the ability to actively manage reserves and the 
ability to trade profitably might be due to the reluctance of central bankers to take on such a 
potentially distracting responsibility, despite the fact that they believe that they could do so 
successfully.  
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 in PPP terms 1996 2001 2006
Anonymous
Anonymous
Australia 32,000 MF IF IF
Canada 32,800 MF IF IF
Chile 11,300
Pegged Float; Crawling band 
against the USD, DEM and JPY IF IF
Ireland 34,100 Pegged with +/-15% EMS band EMU; IF EMU; IF
Israel 22,200
Pegged with +/- 7% band against basket 
of DEM, FRA, JPY, GBP, and USD
Pegged Float; Crawling band against 
the USD, EURO, GBP, and JPY. IF
Italy 28,300 MF EMU; IF EMU; IF
Lithuania 13,700 Fixed at 4 LTL/Dollar Fixed at 4 LTL/Dollar Fixed at 3.4528 LTL/EURO
Mexico 10,000 IF IF IF
Netherlands 30,500 Pegged with +/-15% EMS band EMU; IF EMU; IF
New Zealand 24,100 MF IF IF
Norway 42,400 MF MF IF
Peru 6,000 IF IF MF
Philippines 5,100 MF IF IF
Russia 10,700
Pegged Float with a 4,300 to 
4,900 rubles per dollar band MF MF
Slovakia 15,700
Pegged with +/- 1.5% band 
against two currencies MF
Pegged with 15% target rate 
band of 38.4550 KOR/EURO
Slovenia 20,900 MF MF
Pegged with 15% target rate 
band of 239.640 SIT/EURO
South Africa 11,900 MF IF IF
Spain 25,100 Pegged with +/-15% EMS band EMU; IF EMU; IF
Switzerland 35,000 MF IF IF
Turkey 7,900 IF IF IF
United States 41,800 MF IF IF  
 
Notes:  The table shows the respondents to the survey along with their per-capita PPP-adjusted GDP in USD and their exchange rate regimes as of 1996, 2001 
and 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (1996, 2001, 2006).  Two of 
the 23 respondents preferred to remain anonymous.  The acronyms IF, MF, and EMU stand for independent float, managed float and European Monetary Union.   
The IMF exchange regime definitions need not agree with the self-reported definitions used elsewhere.  
  38Table 2:  Attitudes toward the effects of intervention 
Overall Flexible Fixers
SD D N A SA mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) Stat 1 Stat 2 Stat 3 Stat4
1 Intervention has effects in markets (currencies) other 
than the one in which it is conducted. 0 6 4 11 1 3.32 (0.20) 3.47 (0.21) 2.80 (0.44) 1.62 2.10 -0.48 1.43
2 Intervention typically increases exchange rate volatility. 2 7 5 8 0 2.86 (0.22) 2.76 (0.26) 3.20 (0.33) -0.63 -0.93 0.43 -0.82
Intervention influences exchange rates through the 
following channels:
3.1 …by altering relative supplies of domestic/foreign 
bonds in private portfolios.  3 7 5 6 1 2.77 (0.24) 2.94 (0.28) 2.20 (0.33) -0.95 -0.21 -1.58 1.28
3.2 …by signaling future monetary or other official 
exchange rate policy.  2 0 4 14 2 3.64 (0.21) 3.53 (0.25) 4.00 (0.28) 3.05 2.17 2.22 -0.92
3.3 …by coordinating the expectations of traders on 
fundamental values.  1 3 2 14 2 3.59 (0.21) 3.71 (0.22) 3.20 (0.52) 2.82 2.89 0.44 0.99
3.4 …restoring liquidity in a one-sided market 0 1 0 19 2 4.00 (0.11) 3.94 (0.13) 4.20 (0.18) 8.98 7.24 5.01 -0.95
The following factors increase the probability of a 
successful intervention:
4.1 Coordinated intervention with other central banks 1 2 1 10 6 3.90 (0.24) 3.80 (0.27) 4.20 (0.52) 3.69 2.73 2.36 -0.68
4.2 The first intervention in a series  1 2 3 11 4 3.71 (0.22) 3.75 (0.26) 3.60 (0.46) 3.18 2.78 1.24 0.27
4.3 Larger interventions 0 1 4 15 2 3.82 (0.14) 3.94 (0.15) 3.40 (0.22) 5.91 6.08 1.40 1.67
4.4 Market uncertainty about the relation of exchange 
rates to long-term fundamentals  0 2 6 10 4 3.73 (0.18) 3.82 (0.21) 3.40 (0.36) 3.96 3.84 1.01 0.94
4.5 High market uncertainty about current events  0 3 6 8 4 3.62 (0.21) 3.75 (0.21) 3.20 (0.52) 2.99 3.10 0.46 1.11
4.6 Intervention in the same direction as current market 
trends (e.g., purchase the USD as it is appreciating) 2 2 2 12 4 3.64 (0.25) 3.47 (0.30) 4.20 (0.18) 2.60 1.67 2.31 -1.23
5 Some authorities are more successful than most in 
intervening. 0 1 8 10 1 3.55 (0.15) 3.53 (0.15) 3.67 (0.54) 3.68 3.10 1.64 -0.31
The following characteristics make for a successful 
intervening authority.
5.1 Substantial resources for intervention (i.e., large 
trades) 0 1 3 14 4 3.95 (0.15) 3.94 (0.18) 4.00 (0.28) 6.34 5.25 3.02 -0.16
5.2 Consistency of intervention strategy with 
fundamentals/policy 0 0 1 9 12 4.50 (0.12) 4.47 (0.15) 4.60 (0.22) 12.05 9.94 5.87 -0.42
5.3 Skillful choice of  trading opportunities within the day 1 1 2 14 4 3.86 (0.20) 3.94 (0.21) 3.60 (0.46) 4.41 4.07 1.41 0.70
5.4 Reputation for past success 0 0 2 14 6 4.18 (0.12) 4.06 (0.13) 4.60 (0.22) 9.64 7.88 6.46 -1.92  
Notes:  The table’s columns show the number of respondents who strongly disagreed (SD), disagreed (D), were neutral (N), agreed (A), or strongly agreed (SA) 
with the statement in the left-hand column.  The panels show the mean level of agreement and its standard error for 3 groups of respondents:  1) all respondents; 
2) respondents intervening in flexible markets; 3) respondents intervening in both fixed and flexible markets. The test statistics labeled stat 1, stat 2, stat 3 and 
stat 4 are t statistics for the null hypotheses that the mean of these three groups equaled three (stat 1 through stat 3) and that the mean response for the floating 
and fixed groups was equal. Stat 1 through stat 4 were calculated from a regression of responses on floating/fixed indicators while the standard errors of the 
means were calculated from the distributions of the overall, floating and fixed responses, respectively. Shaded cells denote absolute values greater than 1.64. 
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Table 3:  Intervention reaction function responses 





Accumulating reserves/customer transactions Instantly Instantly
Changes in Interest Rates/Monetary Policy (4) Instantly Instantly
Desire to coordinate with another central bank Immediately Immediately
Effect of appreciation on economic activity/trade < 1 minute Immediately
High transitory volatility that is not linked to fundamentals 5 minutes Immediately
Inflation 10 minutes Immediately
International Events 15 minutes after decision < 1 minute
Liquidity management (2) < 20 min < 1 minute
Political Events (2) 30-60 minutes 1 minute
Political Factors: elections, referenda, etc. < 1 hour 1 minute
Political Tension < 1 hour 1 minute
1 hour 2 minutes
1 hour 3-5 minutes
1 hour 5 minutes
1-2 hours 5 minutes
1-2 hours Within minutes
A few hours < 10 min
several hours 10 minutes
6 hours 10 minutes
1-5 days < 1 hour  
Notes:  The first column shows “Non-FX” factors that respondents list as possibly precipitating intervention.  Numbers in parentheses show the number of 
authorities that responded with the particular answer.  The second column shows the intervention response time if there had been no intervention recently, while 
the third column shows the response times listed if the authority were “on alert” for exchange rate developments.  The responses are sorted alphabetically or 
numerically in each column, not according to the list of responding authorities in Table 1.  The three questions are as follows: 1. Intervention sometimes responds 
directly to conditions or factors outside the foreign exchange market?  Please provide an example(s) of an economic variable or event to which intervention 
might respond.  2. Suppose that there had been no recent intervention, how quickly could the monetary authority intervene in response to market developments or 
events?  3. How quickly could the monetary authority react (begin intervening) if it was already on “alert” for exchange rate developments?   
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Overall Flexible Fixers
SD D N A SA mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) Stat 1 Stat 2 Stat 3 Stat4
1 Intervention sometimes responds directly to conditions 
or factors outside the foreign exchange market?   2 3 1 14 1 3.43 (0.24) 3.25 (0.30) 4.00 (0.00) 1.79 0.91 2.03 -1.33
The following factors influence the size of the 
intervention.   
2.1 Market liquidity 0 2 0 12 8 4.18 (0.18) 4.29 (0.18) 3.80 (0.44) 6.65 6.30 2.11 1.15
2.2 Strength of market trends 0 2 2 9 9 4.14 (0.20) 4.24 (0.20) 3.80 (0.52) 5.80 5.39 1.89 0.91
2.3 Desire to make an impact 0 1 2 13 6 4.09 (0.16) 4.06 (0.19) 4.20 (0.18) 6.98 5.70 3.50 -0.36
3 After an initial intervention, my authority is more likely to 
intervene again if the initial intervention was successful.
3 7 7 4 1 2.68 (0.23) 2.65 (0.28) 2.80 (0.33) -1.41 -1.31 -0.40 -0.27
The following factors increase the likelihood that a 
central bank will want to keep an intervention secret
4.1 Previous failure in moving the exchange rate in the 
desired direction. 1 2 7 6 3 3.42 (0.24) 3.36 (0.30) 3.60 (0.36) 1.76 1.22 1.22 -0.43
4.2 Desired intervention is seen as inconsistent with an 
exchange rate target.  1 2 6 7 3 3.47 (0.24) 3.50 (0.28) 3.40 (0.46) 1.98 1.70 0.81 0.17
4.3 Desired intervention is inconsistent with monetary/ 
macro fundamentals.  1 2 7 6 3 3.42 (0.24) 3.43 (0.28) 3.40 (0.46) 1.76 1.46 0.81 0.05
4.4 The intervention leans against the wind (is contrary to 
recent trends).  1 5 3 8 2 3.26 (0.26) 3.43 (0.31) 2.80 (0.33) 1.03 1.40 -0.39 1.06
The following characteristics increase the probability that 
secret intervention will be detected by the market.
5.1 Large interventions 0 0 1 13 5 4.21 (0.12) 4.21 (0.15) 4.20 (0.18) 10.13 8.25 4.87 0.05
5.2 Coordinated intervention with other monetary 
authorities 0 1 2 9 7 4.16 (0.19) 3.86 (0.20) 5.00 (0.00) 6.22 4.76 6.64 -3.26
5.3 Existence of recent previous interventions  0 0 3 15 1 3.89 (0.10) 4.00 (0.10) 3.60 (0.22) 8.73 8.62 3.09 1.77
5.4 Past success in moving the exchange rate in the 
desired direction 0 2 8 8 1 3.42 (0.17) 3.43 (0.19) 3.40 (0.36) 2.45 2.03 1.13 0.07
5.5 Greater perceived misalignment of exchange rates from 
long-run values  0 3 4 11 1 3.53 (0.19) 3.50 (0.24) 3.60 (0.22) 2.80 2.16 1.55 -0.22  
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Table 5:  Beliefs about the profitability of intervention 
Overall Flexible Fixers
SD D N A SA mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) Stat 1 Stat 2 Stat 3 Stat4
1 Could active management generate a positive 
excess return —in excess of opportunity cost—at 
reasonable risk for the taxpayer? 3 2 8 7 0 2.95 (0.23) 3.21 (0.25) 2.33 (0.38) -0.22 0.81 -1.65 1.82
I believe that my authority’s trading desk could 
trade profitably with holding periods over the 
following horizons:
2.1 Intraday strategies 1 2 8 10 0 3.29 (0.18) 3.47 (0.16) 2.83 (0.44) 1.59 2.22 -0.50 1.61
2.2 Weeks or months 1 2 6 12 0 3.38 (0.18) 3.47 (0.19) 3.17 (0.44) 2.07 2.06 0.47 0.71
2.3 One- to 10-year holding periods.  2 2 6 8 3 3.38 (0.25) 3.53 (0.26) 3.00 (0.53) 1.54 1.77 0.00 0.95  
 
Notes:  See the notes to Table 2. 
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Table 6:  Arguments against intervention 
Overall Flexible Fixers
SD D N A SA mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) mean (s.e.) Stat 1 Stat 2 Stat 3 Stat4
The following arguments persuade you that intervention is 
unwise.  That is, with which arguments do you (personally) 
agree?
1.1 Intervention will confuse the public with respect to 
monetary/other policies.  2 11 4 3 2 2.64 (0.24) 2.59 (0.26) 2.80 (0.52) -1.54 -1.46 -0.39 -0.36
1.2 Intervention is ineffective at changing exchange rates 4 7 7 3 1 2.55 (0.23) 2.65 (0.28) 2.20 (0.33) -1.98 -1.31 -1.61 0.79
1.3 Intervention will move exchange rates away from market 
determined values. 0 9 5 7 1 3.00 (0.20) 2.94 (0.24) 3.20 (0.33) 0.00 -0.24 0.45 -0.51
1.4 Intervention will be used to substitute for other 
necessary policy changes.  1 4 6 8 3 3.36 (0.23) 3.53 (0.24) 2.80 (0.52) 1.60 2.03 -0.42 1.34  
 
Notes:  See the notes to Table 2. 
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